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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:-Equal Protection-Property
Ownership Qualifications on the Right To Vote
in Special Municipal Elections-Cipriano
v. City of Houma*
Plaintiff, a resident of Houma, Louisiana, who owned no real
property, brought a class action seeking to prevent the city from
issuing utility revenue bonds approved by a vote of the property
taxpayers at a special election. He argued that the Louisiana statute1
restricting the right to vote in such elections to property owners2
was unconstitutional. Plantiff relied on Harper v. Virginia Board of
Elections, 3 in which the Supreme Court declared that Virginia's required payment of poll taxes for voting in general elections was a
violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Harper, he claimed, established that any voter qualification
based on property ownership violates the equal protection clause.
The three-judge federal district court rejected this argument, one
judge dissenting; held, the denial to residents who do not own
property of the right to vote in municipal elections on the issuance
of revenue bonds for public utilities does not violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
In general, ·there appear to be two types of limitations on the
right to vote that are constitutionally permissible. Voter-qualification requirements may be sustained either when they promote intelligent or responsible voting4 (voting competence) or when they
• 286 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. La. 1968). This case was reversed by the Supreme Court in
a unanimous decision on June 16, 1969 while this issue was in the final stage of being
printed. N.Y. Times, June 17, 1969, at 57, col. 5.
1. LA. REv. STAT. § 33:4258 (1950), pursuant to LA. CONST. art. 14, § 14(a). In the
case of utility revenue bonds, LA. CONST. art. 14, § 14(m) contemplates an optional
election, but the section first mentioned above makes it mandatory. If the voters in
the special election veto the bond issue, that veto is decisive. If they approve it, final
approval must still be given by the local governing body. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 33:4252,
33:4258 (1950). Only the constitutionality of the distinction between property owners
and nonproperty owners will be examined here; it should be noted, however, that the
Louisiana statutes cited require that bond issues be authorized by a majority of the
property taxpayers in "number and amount"-a requirement of doubtful constitutionality in light of the development of, and emphasis on, one man-one vote.
2. The property taxpayer requirement has been interpreted as a property ownership
requirement. McFatter v. Beauregard Parish School Bd., 211 La. 443, 30 S.2d 197
(1947); C. ADRIAN & C. PRESS, GOVERNING URBAN AMERICA 90 (3d ed. 1968) ("By
property taxpayers are meant property owners, of course").
3. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
4. In Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959), the
Court upheld North Carolina's literacy requirement, concluding that "[t]he ability to
read and write has some relation to standards designed to promote the intelligent use
of the ballot." Other qualifications the Court there cited as constitutionally permissible
were age, re.-;idence, and previous criminal record.
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serve to separate persons with a substantial interest in the outcome
of an election from others with little or no such interest5 (interest
in the result). If the property ownership qualification in Cipriano
performs either of these functions, the decision of the district court
should be upheld.
Qualifications for voting are traditionally established by the
legislature, and thus it might seem that the legislative determination on the questions of voting competence and interest in the
election should prevail. A strong presumption of validity normally
attaches to legislative enactments, 6 and consequently it is not the
function of the judiciary to decide whether the means adopted by
the legislature are the best means possible to attain the end sought.7
Indeed, the court in Cipriano relied heavily on the legislature's
There is some indication that restrictions on the states may be even more stringent
when a congressional enactment is involved than when the fourteenth amendment alone
is involved. In Cardona v. Power, 384 U.S. 672 (1966), the Court found that by force
of the supremacy clause and section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973(e) (Supp. III, 1965-1967), the State of New York's English literacy requirement
cannot be enforced against persons legally literate in Spanish by virtue of successful
completion of sixth grade in a public school, or in a private school accredited by the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
The Court has condemned voter qualifications which bear no demonstrable relation
to the promotion of intelligence and responsibility in voting. For instance, in Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965), it struck down a provision of the Texas constitution
which prohibited any member of the armed forces who moved to Texas from ever
\'Oting in that state while still in the armed forces. 380 U.S. at 91-92. In Harper, the
Court declared the Virginia poll tax unconstitutional saying, "Voter qualifications
have no relation ••• to paying •.• this or any other tax." 383 U.S. at 666.
5. The Supreme Court has stressed the basic premise that issues should be decided
by a majority of the people concerned. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry
v. Sanders, 376 U.S. I (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186 (1962). As one distinguished observer has concluded, "In all the cases emerges
the basic proposition that a majority of the human beings concerned ,viii determine
their political and economic fate." A. SUTHERLAND, CoNSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 508
(1965).
It is apparent that if a person has no concern with the outcome of an election, it is
not a denial of equal protection to deny him the right to vote. However, it will not
always be possible to say that a person has no interest whatsoever in the outcome of
an election. Rather, the line must be drawn on the ground that certain people have a
substantially greater interest in an issue than others, whose interest may be indirect or
insubstantial. If this is established, it is not unreasonable or unfair to exclude the
latter group from voting on a particular issue. For instance, a resident of Ann Arbor
who commutes fifty miles to Detroit to work is undoubtedly affected by and interested
in the outcome of the municipal elections in Detroit; however, it is not unconstitutional
to deny him the right to vote in those elections. The distinction would have to be
drawn on the basis of the fact that property owners as opposed to those who did not
own property in Detroit were substantially more interested in the outcome and issues
of such general elections, and the latter group had no other interests substantial enough
to entitle them to vote.
6. See, e.g., Toombs v. Citizens Bank, 281 U.S. 643, 647 (1930); Home Tel. &: Tel.
Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 211 U.S. 265 (1908).
7. McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539, 547 (1909); cf. Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v.
Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527 (1959). See also Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram Distillers
Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936); Standard Oil Co. v. City of Marysville, 279 U.S. 582 (1929);
St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Board of Directors, 207 F. 338 (8th Cir. 1913).
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determination that the property ownership qualification serves as
a wise fiscal restraint. 8 However, it is clear that the legislature
cannot choose a method that violates the fundamental liberties
of individuals if the same end can be achieved without infringing
those liberties.9 In the Cipriano situation, there might well be
alternative means for promoting fiscal restraint which do not impinge on a number of citizens' right to vote, as the property ownership qualification does. Possible alternatives include such mechanisms as manipulation of debt ceilings, state approval of locally
approved bond issues, or the present requirement of the Louisiana
statute that final approval of the bond issue be given by the local
governing body. 10 If these alternative means are as reasonable and as
workable as that of a property ownership requirement, the statutory
limitation on the right to vote in Cipriano would be unconstitutional.11
But even assuming that there are no such reasonable and workable alternatives, the legislative determination is not necessarily
conclusive. When the franchise is involved, the normal presumption
in favor of the legislature is not as strong as it is in other cases. The
Supreme Court has indicated more than once that "any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and
meticulously scrutinized." 12 Harper and subsequent voting rights
cases established that statutorily imposed restrictions on voters run
afoul of the equal protection clause if they are "irrational," "arbitrary," or "invidious"13 or if they are not "reasonable in light of
8. Principal case at 827-28.
9. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960); see Note, Constitutional LawPolice Power-Michigan Statute Requiring Motorcyclists To Wear Protective Helmets
Held Unconstitutional, 67 MICH. L. REv. 360, 366-67 (1968). This principle is supported
by the general rule, stated in People v. Armstrong, 73 Mich. 288, 41 N.W. 275 (1889),
that the state may impose restraints on the individual only to the extent which is
required or necessary for the protection of public health, safety, or welfare. This seems
to imply that if a statutory restriction is not necessary or essential-that is if there is
another method to the same end that does not infringe a fundamental right-the
restriction is invalid. Note, supra, at 366 n.35.
10. See note 1 supra.
11. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951), in which the
Court stated that a municipality may not discriminate against interstate commerce,
even in the exercise of its unquestioned power to protect the health and safety of its
people, if reasonable nondiscriminary alternatives, adequate to conserve local interests,
are available. See also Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163
CTustice ·Frankfurter, concurring) (emphasis added):
The precise nature of the interest that has been adversely affected, the manner in
which this was done, the reasons for doing it, the available alternatives to the
procedure that was followed • . . the balance of hurt complained of and good
accomplished-these are some of the considerations that must enter into the judicial
judgment.
12. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) [quoting Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964)].
13. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 484 (1968) (extending the principle of
the apportionment cases to local government elections); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666, 668 (1966).
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their purpose." 14 Thus, it is clear that state statutes that affect voting rights will be struck down despite the legislative presumption
when they make invidious discriminations, are patently arbitrary,
or are irrelevant to the achievement of the state's objective.15
Assuming that the courts will take a more active role in assessing
legislative restrictions on the franchise, the task of determining
whether voter qualification requirements are irrational, invidious,
or unreasonable requires a careful evaluation of possible justifications on the basis of voting competence or interest in the election.
Obviously, if neither justification appears to be particularly relevant to a given set of circumstances, the restriction is improper.16
Thus, if the property ownership qualification applied in the principal case can be justified realistically on one of these bases, it would
be constitutional and the Cipriano decision would be correct.17
One justification for a property ownership qualification on
voting rights is based on the traditional idea that property ownership is related to voting competence.18 The historical notion was
that such a requirement would promote the intelligent and responsible use of the ballot. In colonial times, "property ownership
and payment of taxes [were] the accepted symbols of community
membership and interest." 19 Professor Galbraith has stated that
"[i]n the New World, as in the Old, it was assumed that power be14. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 93 (1965).
15. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd.
of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50·51 (1959).
16. The court in Cipriano appeared to disagree with this analysis. It noted that the
standards of voting competence and interest in the result were applicable only in
general elections and that they did not apply to special elections such as the one in
question. According to this argument, a voter qualification for a special election would
not violate the equal protection clause even if it did not meet one of these standards.
In proposing this principle, the court relied on Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105
(1967), in which the scheme for selecting county school board members was challenged.
In that case, local school boards were elected by popular vote of the residents of the
district; no constitutional question was raised respecting those elections. The constitutional claim was based on the fact that the county board was chosen not by the
electors of the county, but by delegates from the local boards, every local school board
(irrespective of population, wealth, or other differences) having one vote. The Supreme
Court ruled that this scheme was not inconsistent with equal protection and that
municipalities could experiment in the selection of members of administrative agencies.
The court in Cipriano found that the election to approve the issuance of bonds was
not a general election but concerned only administrative functions of the municipality,
and relied on the distinction made in Sailors to approve the property ownership
requirement. However, the Court in Sailors indicated that "where a State provides for
an election of a local official or agency-whether administrative, legislative, or judicial
-the requirements of [equal protection] must be met ...•" 387 U.S. at lll. Although
it did not go on to decide what the requirements of equal protection would be if
there were to be elections for county school board members, there is no apparent reason
for the special-election standard to depart from the criteria applied to general elections.
17. But see notes 9 &: ll supra and accompanying text.
18. The court in the principal case relied primarily on this justification. Principal
case at 827.
19. J. PHILLIPS, MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION IN AMERICA 175 (1960).
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longed, as a right, to men who owned land. Democracy, in its modern meaning, began as a system which gave the suffrage to those who
had proved their worth by acquiring real property and to no
others."20
No state today has property qualifications for voting in general
elections. 21 Professor Phillips has described the abandonment of
such limitations:
In time [however] leveling influences prevailed, and most Americans
refused to accept the contention that there was a necessary relationship between property ownership or payment of taxes and
interest in government or capacity to govern. North Carolina, in
1865, was the last state to abolish property ownership as a qualification for voting in state and national elections ....22

Moreover, even by the end of the 1950's, only a few states required property ownership for voting on bond issues or special
assessments. 23 The unanimous abandonment of property ownership
as a prerequisite for voting in general elections and its apparently
infrequent use as a test for voting in special elections weaken the
purely historical justification for its present-day use. The same sort
of historical and traditional justification was rejected by the Supreme
Court in Harper when it was used in defense of the poll tax. Dissenting in that case, Justice Harlan restated the argument:
It is ... arguable, indeed it was probably accepted as sound political
theory by a large percentage of Americans through most of our
history, that people with some property have a deeper stake in
community affairs, and are consequently more responsible, more
educated, more knowledgeable, more worthy of confidence, than
those without means, and that the community and the Nation
would be better managed if the franchise were restricted to such
citizens.24
20. J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW !NDUSfRIAL STATE 52 (1968).
21. XVII THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 1968-1969,
30 (1968).
22. J. PHILLIPS, supra note 19, at 175.
23. Carville v. McBride, 45 Nev. 305, 202 P. 802 (1922) (state constitution construed
to permit cities to impose property requirements in local bond elections); LA. CONST,
art. 14, § 14(a); LA. REv. STAT. §§ 33:4252, 33:4258 (1950) (see note I supra); MICH,
CoNST. art. 2, § 6 (tax-limit increase or bond issue); MoNT. CONST. art. IX, § 2 [creation
of levy, debt, or liability; construed to apply only to debts or liabilities to be retired
by ad valorem taxes in Cottingham v. State Bd. of Examiners, 134 Mont. I, 328 P.2d
907 (1958)]; NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 387.365-.395 (property owners' veto of approval of sd1ool
bonds), 539.123 (irrigation district elections) (1967); N.M. CoNsr. art. IX, § IO (county
elections on borrowing), § 11 (sdtool district elections on borrowing), § 12 (elections to
increase municipal indebtedness); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-62(4) (1962) (alternative to
literacy requirement in all elections); TEX. CONST. art. 7, § 3 (certain sdtool taxes), art.
9, §§ 4-9, 11 (certain hospital taxes), art. 16, § 59(c) (certain conservation district bonds);
UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 7 (property ownership requirement permissive in elections to
create indebtedness or to levy special taxes).
24. 383 U.S. at 685.
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Nevertheless, the majority concluded that "[v]oter qualifications
have no relation to wealth nor to paying ... this or any other tax." 25
Payment of a property tax, or property ownership, when employed
as a device to promote the "intelligent" use of the ballot, is an
anachronism. Today, there is no reason to believe that property
ownership in any way enhances one's ability to exercise intelligent
judgment in any election. Property owners are not necessarily better educated than others, and a literacy requirement would be a
better device for measuring a potential voter's basic level of education or intelligence than would property ownership. Apart from
considerations of education, there is no reason to believe that
property owners are per se more responsible or more worthy
of confidence than nonproperty owners. With increased mobility
throughout our society-manifested especially by the large number of property owners employed by national public and private
enterprises-it is by no means clear that property owners as a
class have a greater stake in community affairs than those who
do not own property.
However, in a case in which the election involves financing by
increased property taxes, it might be argued that property owners
would indeed be more likely to vote responsibly than those who
do not own property. Nevertheless, when it is recognized that
the property tax is generally not paid by property owners alone,
but is often passed on to tenants, 26 this argument becomes questionable. 'Without the assumption that property owners alone pay
the property tax, there is no fundamental difference between property owners and nonproperty owners that would make the former
more likely to vote responsibly in such an election.27 In short, it
25. 383 U.S. at 666. Whether or not the property tax qualification attacked in the
principal case (as opposed to property ownership qualifications generally) is ipso facto
unconstitutional by virtue of Harper is not clear, although such a conclusion is certainly within a literal reading of the words quoted in the te.'Xt.
26. When the demand for rental housing is price inelastic, owners of such property
will raise rents and pass on the increased tax promptly. D. NETZER, EcoNOMICS OF THE
PROPERTY TAX. 45-46 (1966). This would be the case especially with respect to multifamily units, owned and maintained for investment purposes; and this is the largest
share of rental housing by property value. See also C. ADRIAN & C. PRESS, supra note 2,
at 90: "Contrary to popular misunderstanding, a renter pays just as much in property
taxes as an owner, although it is hidden in the rent."
27. There is some suggestion that while there is no economic difference between
owners and lessees with respect to payment of property taxes, there may be a psychological
difference. C. ADRIAN & C. PRESS, supra note 2, at 90. It may be true that property owners
ha\'e a greater awareness of the burden of financing when the property tax is to be
used to finance the improvement or e."Xpenditure authorized by an election. Nevertheless, the distinction is merely one of degree, and its magnitude cannot be demonstrated.
Moreover, the common practice of landlords of justifying rent increases by virtue of
increased property taxes weakens the claim that tenants are less aware of the relevant
is~ues at stake in such an election. It should be noted, however, that the bond issue
election in Cipriano did not present a case in which the property tax was to be used
to finance the improvement. Principal case at 824; Judge Wisdom's dissent at 829; LA.
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is impossible to find any significant connection between the ownership of real property and the ability to exercise the franchise
intelligently and responsibly.28 Consequently, any property qualification such as that in Cipriano seems to be irrational and arbitrary
with respect to voting competence and the legislative presumption
in favor of that qualification is thus overcome.29
The property ownership requirement might still be justified,
however, if it serves to separate citizens with a substantial interest
in the outcome of the election from those whose interest is not
substantial.30 If the outcome of an election affects property owners alone, or if it affects them to a substantially greater degree 31
than it does others, a property ownership qualification would not
violate the equal protection clause.32 But it is clear that when the
issue at stake in an election affects all citizens in much the same
manner and degree, restricting the class of voters to property owners is arbitrary and, therefore, unconstitutional. 33
This type of analysis has been applied recently. In Pierce v.
Village of Ossining,34 a three-judge federal district court held that
a restriction of the franchise to "owner[s] of property in the village
assessed upon the last preceding assessment-role thereof" 35 was
invalid. The issue at stake in the election was whether or not the
village should change from a mayoral system to a village-manager
system of government. In holding that this classification of voters
was arbitrary and had no reasonable relation to proper qualifications for voting, the court declared:
The proposition on which plaintiffs have been excluded from
voting would work a fundamental change in the village government where they live. Whether that change should be made affects
all who live in the Village so that denying the franchise to those
who do not own real property is an invidious discrimination. 36
CoNsr. art. 14, § 14(m). Consequently, any argument as to the greater responsibility of
property owners by virtue of their financing of an improvement through the property
tax, or their greater awareness of such financing, should have no bearing on the
decision in the principal case. See text accompanying note 4 infra.
28. For a discussion of property ownership as a qualification on the right to bold
elective town office and a conclusion that it is impermissible, see Landes v. Town of
North Hempstead, 20 N.Y.2d 417, 421, 231 N.E.2d 120, 122, 284 N.Y.S.2d 441, 444,
(1967). But cf. Schweitzer v. Plymouth City Clerk, 381 Mich. 485, 164 N.W.2d 35 (1969).
29. See notes 13-15 supra and accompanying text.
30. See note 5 supra.
31. See notes 43-45 infra and accompanying text.
32. See note 5 supra.
33. Id.
34. 292 F. Supp. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (unanimous decision by three-judge court),
35. N.Y. VILLAGE LAw § 4-402(b) (McKinney 1966).
36. 292 F. Supp. at 115. But see Croen v. Vetrano, 52 Misc. 2d 915, 277 N.Y.S.2d 354
(Sup. Ct. 1967) (sustaining a restriction on the right to vote in referenda on the question
of incorporation of a village to owners of real property in the territory involved).
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Thus, when all residents of a community have equal concern with
an election issue, the fourteenth amendment demands that they
have equal voice in the decision.
Conversely, when there is a substantial difference between the
interests of various classes of persons and when a reasonable attempt
is made to identify those classes which have a substantially greater
interest in a particular election, the vote may be constitutionally
denied to others.37 In Kramer v. Union Free School District No.15, 38
a resident of the defendant school district-a twenty-eight year
old bachelor living in the home of his parents-launched a fourteenth amendment challenge against the provisions of the New
York Education Law39 which denied him the right to vote in school
district elections. The statute provided that only residents who
owned taxable real property, their spouses, lessees in the school
district (but not their spouses),40 and parents or guardians of children attending district schools had the right to vote in such elections. The majority of the three-judge federal district court found
the statute valid as a reasonable attempt to limit the vote
to those district residents who, [the legislature] believes, have a
direct interest in the administration of the school system because
they are either real estate taxpayers (or renters of taxable real
estate) and thus carry the burden of paying for a major share of
the services provided by the school districts, or because they are
directly involved as parents of pupils attending the schools in
question.41

The interests recognized in the statute as qualifying residents
to vote are clearly relevant to the issues presented in the electionelecting members to the school board, approval of the budget, and
levying taxes on taxable real property in the district to meet the
expenses for the coming year. 42 The classes enumerated in the
statute have direct and substantial interests in those issues in addi87. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
88. 282 F. Supp. 70 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (2-1 decision), prob. juris. noted, 393 U.S.
818 (1968) (No. 258). The issue presented on appeal is whether N.Y. EDuc. LAW
§ 2012 (McKinney 1953) as applied to deny petitioner his right to vote in school district
elections violates the equal protection clause or the first amendment as made applicable
to the states by the fourteenth. The first amendment issue was not discussed by the
lower court.
39. N.Y. EDUC. I.Aw § 2012 (McKinney 1953).
40. Since Kramer, the statute has been amended (effective June 16, 1968) to extend
the vote to the spouse of "one who leases, hires or is in possession of a contract of
purchase of, real property in such district liable to taxation for school purposes •••."
N.Y. EDuc. I.Aw § 2012(3)(a) (McKinney 1969). The constitutionality of the former
provision extending the vote to spouses of owners of taxable real property while denying it to spouses of lessees of such property seems doubtful. However, the question was
not raised in Kramer since the plaintiff had no standing to represent spouses of lessees.
41. 282 F. Supp. at 73.
42. N.Y. EDUC. LAW§§ 2021, 2022 (McKinney 1953).
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tion to the general interest-which is all that could be asserted
by the plaintiff-in educational policy and in the schools as sociocultural institutions. Although it cannot be said that the plaintiff
was completely unaffected by or disinterested in the issues decided
by the school district elections, the substantial difference between
his interests and the interests of those eligible to vote indicates
that the Kramer decision is a sound one.
Another type of election in which the right to vote might be
constitutionally restricted to a certain class of citizens-in this case
property owners--is a special assessment election on the issue
of whether to construct public improvements affecting property in a
specific area. 43 Special-assessment financing generally assumes that
the property adjacent to certain types of public improvements re•
ceives special benefits from the improvements; therefore, it imposes the burden of paying for this kind of improvement upon the
owners of adjacent parcels of land. 44 It might be reasonable to
restrict the right to vote on whether to construct public projects
financed in this way to the same group of property owners. 40 However, if people who did not own property-for example, lessees of
real property that was to be specially assessed-were affected in
substantially the same way, the property ownership qualification
could still be held unconstitutional. It might be argued that although lessees do share to some degree in the benefits and burdens, their interests are not nearly so great as those of the property
owners. Factors which might be said to cause this difference in
interest are transiency and investment of the property owner in
the community in terms of the length of his connection with it
and his direct payment of taxes. However, it is doubtful that
property ownership is an accurate measure of connection with the
43. Special assessments for public improvements are special charges imposed by law
on land to defray the expenses in whole or in part of a local improvement on the theory
that the owner of the property has received special benefits from the improvement over
and above the benefits accruing to the community in general. See, e.g., Fluckey v.
City of Plymouth, 358 Mich. 447, 450, 100 N.W. 2d 486, 489 (1960); County of Westchester v. Town of Harrison, 201 Misc. 211, 215, 114 N.Y.S.2d 492,497, (Sup. Ct. 1951).
This is not to say that there are no benefits outside the group whose property is
assessed, but that this group has benefited specially by the enhancement of their
property.
No state statute authorizing such a special-assessment election could be found, such
assessments normally being made by the local legislative body. See, e.g., l\I. HOWARD,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC FINANCE 298-99 (1940); ·w. WINTER, THE SPECIAL ASSESSMENT
TODAY WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE MICHIGAN EXPERIENCE 67-68, 98 (Michigan
Governmental Studies, No. 26, 1952). Hence, it is posed here as a hypothetical.
44. See note 43 supra.
45. Although it is difficult to conceive of a situation in which a municipal improvement in a particular neighborhood would not have some incidental effects on other
residents or property in the city, merely incidental beneficiaries with a small and
intangible interest need not be allowed to vote. See note 5 supra and text accompanying
notes 37-41 supra.
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community or concern with the special improvement. 46 It must
be reiterated that often lessees effectively pay the property tax.47
and share the benefits of improvements such as improved sewers,
wider streets, or community parks; thus, it appears that the interests of lessees and property owners are likely to be identical. Moreover, it may be unrealistic to expect a state or local legislative body
to establish adequate guidelines which would take account of all
possible variations in the comparative interests of the two classes
of residents. It may be impractical, therefore, to attempt to restrict
the lessees' franchise so that they can vote only when their interests
are exactly equivalent to the interests of property owners. Furthermore, such a determination should not be left entirely to the courts
since the establishment of voter qualifications has traditionally been
a legislative concern. Thus, it appears that the best course, consistent with both practicality and the equal protection clause, is
to extend the franchise to lessees and property owners whenever
the interests of the two groups in the burdens and benefits at stake
in an election are generally similar.
Although the three-judge federal district court in Cipriano
did not consider this standard, the case appears to be wrongly de46. Transiency may indeed be relevant in determining the degree of one's interest
in a public improvement, but the usual method of taking account of this factor is to
use a residency requirement. It is more direct and does not encompass considerations
which are irrelevant to the concern; consequently, it should be used if the goal is to
limit the franchise to those who have a relationship to the community of significant
duration.
It might also be argued that one's investment in the community is to be inferred
from the length of his connection with it, but again residence would appear to be the
relevant consideration rather than the fact of property ownership. See Shapiro v.
Thompson, 37 U.S.L.W. 4333 (U.S. April 21, 1969). This case stresses the restriction
which welfare residence requirements place on the right to_ travel freely within the
United States, 37 U.S.L.W. at 4336-37. It could be argued that residence requirements
imposed on the franchise in special assessment elections have a similar effect; however,
it seems clear that there is a significant difference in the magnitude of the effect. Perhaps one's participation in civic affairs is more indicative of a concern about the community than any of the foregoing considerations; but there is no necessary relation
between such participation and property ownership.
,vith respect to payment of taxes as a measure of one's investment in the community, both property owners and lessees pay taxes, including the property tax. See
note 26 supra and accompanying texL Although there may be some difference in degree
with respect to the latter, such differences are not easily measured since the lessee's
payments arc merged in his rcnL Consequently, any distinctions between property owners
and lessees based on differences in degree of payment of property taxes would be
administratively impracticable.
There is a difference in investments in the community in that the tenant's rent
does not buy a permanent interest in the property. Yet the significance of this difference for the question of the restriction of the vote in special assessment elections is
not clear. Public improvements may indeed affect the value of property in either
direction. ,\'hcthcr property values increase or decrease, the fact that they are affected
makes it doubtful that property owners arc in the best position to pass exclusive
judgment on the wisdom or desirability of a public improvement that also affects others.
47. See note 26 supra.
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cided when the standard is applied. Property owners have no greater
interest in the bond issue election involved in that case than do
those residents who do not own property in the community. All
residents of the city would benefit in substantially the same way
from the construction of the utility, and because the utility was not
to be financed by property taxes, 48 property owners would bear
no more burden than other residents. Since the burdens and benefits were equal for all, the question was essentially a general one
involving the administration of city affairs. And because property
owners were no more concerned with or affected by the outcome
of the election than were other residents, the property ownership
qualification was clearly inconsistent with the demands of equal
protection and should be invalidated.

48. See note 27 supra.

